This is a review of some of the points made by Anthony J. Carroll in his paper:http://www.heythrop.ac.uk/images/stories/hirepl/publications/tcarroll/religious_symbols.pdf
Carroll says, "Is it reasonable [of secular liberals?] to presume that religions cannot judge between unfair proselytism and the reasonable acknowledgement of one's faith in the public domain? I think not." - On the contrary I think it is. The reason being that most faiths, and certainly the big three, are absolutist in their views about the truth of their religions.
The very fact that this discussion is taking place so openly in secular democratic states is indicative of the fact that there is not (or should not be) any absolutist view from liberal-democratic (or philosophically-atheistic) world views - they should always be open to debate and persuasion.
Carroll says, "The alternative to the liberal position is the so-called 'Anglo-Saxon' model. This model acknowledges the positive insights of communitarianism about how learning and socialisation are accomplished within particular communities with distinctive commitments. Communitarianism privileges the good of a particular tradition over the claims to universal rightness of a neutral reason supposedly independent of tradition and cultural context. It readily accepts a pluralism of cultures within the one society. Continental European societies, however, are concerned that such a model will lead to ever greater fragmentation, a fear that is not, in present late-modern or postmodern societies, without foundation. When, therefore, the French state sees headscarves in the classroom, it fears societal atomization and the weakening of the social bond-le lien social. If you let one group do their own thing, the danger is that everyone will simply go their own way. Society will disintegrate, and the result will be nothing other than anarchic tribalism."
This seems a reasonable view. The liberal approach appears to offer the opportunity for more cohesion. Granted, there may be a problem where religious communities object to this approach, and so potentially detract from that possibility of cohesion. But that is generally the nature of such groups, a nature that the secularist liberal objecting to.
In liberal secularism there is also the objection to the promotion to children of singular absolutist views within religious (or political or any other) communities, since with closed communities this amounts to indoctrination. Note that this is not an objection to the promotion of religious beliefs. Following liberal democratic principles it should be open for any religious, political or other group to express their views to adults, and to attempt to persuade adults within the bounds of law*. Further more, there is no objection to the teaching about religions, atheism and other world views within a well controlled non-indoctrinating classroom.
The problems only arise because some religions, or at least some sub-groups, not only believe that the truth of their religious world view is absolute, but, because they believe so, they assume they have the right to impose that view on everyone else, at the expense of democratic principles. I think Carroll's solutions require that these groups relinquish such aims.
Imagine, if you will, if you can, an absolutist dogmatic religious world view that includes in it the view that democracy is invalid, evil and must be replaced by the one true theocracy. Further, that world view sees nothing wrong in using all the tools, all the 'weaknesses', of that evil democracy to democratically win control of the state, with the intention of making it a theocracy. What road back remains for those of other faiths, or atheists, for democracy. This is the terrible fear that drives the liberal democratic secular movement. And it isn't based solely on distant historical experiences of religious wars, as Carroll suggests.
"However, as I have argued, its [secular liberalism's] seemingly neutral, rational principles are in reality neither neutral nor independent of material claims. Liberalism is itself an ideology; it is grounded in a particular vision of the world, one that is all the more powerful because it is not explicitly acknowledged." - I think it is explicitly acknowledged, by secular liberals, and I understand that it might not be by those that don't share the view. It is the more powerful because it is the most cohesive and is not exclusive. It is also the most beneficial to the most people - both as a society and as individuals. It is not perfect, but then perfection is a flawed notion when applied to human social organisation (see my blog on perfection: http://ronmurp.blogspot.com/2007/07/perfection.html).
"For its part, communitarianism respects the particularities and the substantive claims of distinct groups. It supports the freedom to live according to one's own moral, religious and cultural convictions." - Only coincidentally. This "freedom to live..." is not a requirement in any group, except within liberal democracy where it exists as part of the definition of that world view and is not superseded by any 'higher power'.
"Liberalism stresses freedom at the cost of ideological blindness and naïveté; communitarianism fosters cohesionat the risk of societal atomization. How can one draw on the strengths of these conflicting positions and avoid the limitations of each of them?" I don't see ideological blindness as a fault - your ideology shouldn't prevent your access to, for example education. In suggesting that "communitarianism fosters cohesion" surely there is no suggestion that liberalism does not? Liberalism fosters super-cohesion beyond any particular group, while at the same time imposing no restriction on cohesion within groups, given safeguards.
As for Carrol's proposals: "Acknowledging Commitments", "Citizenship", "Appropriate Assertiveness" - I agree with all his sentiments here.
The examples of the headscarf or the crucifix should pose no problem for state schools, if Carroll's guidelines are followed. There remains the problem of other forms of dress, such as the complete covering of the face except for the eyes. It has been argued that this form of dress is inappropriate since it prevents full communication between teacher and pupil. So where does this lie in Carroll's mind?
*If it is felt that a law does restrict religious expression among adults the liberal democratic system allows for that law to be challenged.
Saturday, 28 July 2007
Perfection
This notion of perfection is often used to prove god exists. Aquinas employs it in his proofs. It would be stretching credibility even to say it 'suggests' there might be a god - but to say it proves it is ridiculous.
The whole notion of perfection in anything is simply that - a notion. It's a vague notion of direction or improvement: "this is good", "this is better", "keep improving until you get to perfection", which of course we recognise we can't achieve - therefore jump to the conclusion that the only entity that can we call God, and so god exists. Nonsense.
If perfection doesn't exists, and there's no reason to suspect it does, then it cannot be used to conclude God exists. And even if perfection was a reality, and if we chose to call it God, there is no reason to attribute all the usual properties to god that make him the personal god that religions promote.
The whole notion of perfection in anything is simply that - a notion. It's a vague notion of direction or improvement: "this is good", "this is better", "keep improving until you get to perfection", which of course we recognise we can't achieve - therefore jump to the conclusion that the only entity that can we call God, and so god exists. Nonsense.
If perfection doesn't exists, and there's no reason to suspect it does, then it cannot be used to conclude God exists. And even if perfection was a reality, and if we chose to call it God, there is no reason to attribute all the usual properties to god that make him the personal god that religions promote.
Wednesday, 18 July 2007
McGrath, Dennet, Dawkins - Memes
I read this debate between Dennet and McGrath: http://www.rsa.org.uk/acrobat/dennett_130306.pdf
I think McGrath is right to point out that the meme hypothesis is purely that - with no evidence. The hypothesis can be made to fit history, but is it falsifiable, and what supportive evidence is there?
McGrath points out Blackmore's acceptence that atheism is a meme, just as theism is. Is atheism a meme? In some respects - when there is unquestioned belief in atheism. And I suppose the same hypothesis can be applied to any human idea - such as the appreciation of art, what art is, how it evolved, etc.
But scientific atheism accepts its own vulnerability, and does not claim infalability, and does not require faith. It is not a belief system in itself, but a consequence of what all humans do - attempt to understand and reason about the world around us. Atheism is a probabilistic conclusion, not a dogma, not a self sustaining belief. It may be that atheism as a world view is falsified in the future, by scientifically supported evidence of God. But how would theism be falsified? No matter what was discovered about the universe god could always be postulated to be beyond that.
McGrath points out some of the flaws in the meme hypothesis: "But my real question is this: how would Dr Blackmore and Professor Dennett be able to settle that point scientifically? If they are not able to do so, then we have a non-scientific debate about imaginary entities, hypothesised by analogy with the gene. And we all know how unreliable arguments based on analogy can be – witness the fruitless search for the luminiferous ether in the late nineteenth century, based on the supposed analogy between light and sound. It was analogically plausible – but non-existent. The analogy was invalid. Richard Dawkins tells us that memes are merely awaiting their Crick and Watson; I think they are merely waiting for their Michelson and Morley."
I would agree with this, particularly about the inappropriateness of analogies sometimes. Dawkins Burka analogy in "The God Delusion" is suspect, for example.
McGrath makes another good point about the association of 'evil' with religion: "Now Professor Dennett might respond by saying that these are not typical of atheism. I believe he would be right to do so. But neither are the excesses of violence and intolerance that he does mention, typical of religion. I appreciate the need for a bit of rhetoric and exaggeration to spice up an argument, but one cannot represent the pathological elements of any movement, religious or antireligious, as if they were normal or typical. Few of us in this audience tonight are in favour of fanaticism; but it is clearly perfectly possible to be a fanatical atheist, as much as a fanatical religionist. It’s fanaticism that’s the problem, not religion or anti-religion."
Agreed. I think the early use of the 'evil', as in 'evil in the name of...' and the other old chestnut 'the problem of evil' are fine as simplistic rebuttals of simplistic claims of theist about the inherent goodness of religion. Both theists and atheists would be better to leave these out of the main debate. Basically 'evil' can be performed by anyone, religious or not. And the problem of evil can be argued either way, as problematic for theism, or inconsequential as evidence against.
McGrath is right here: "In Oxford, we are facing a threat from one of the most fanatical groups in British society today: animal rights protestors. They are not religious. They are driven by an ideology – by a world view. Surely our common enemy is the fanatic, first and foremost. We need to reflect on how to control this phenomenon. But it is a clear factual error to assume that this is limited to, or necessarily characteristic of, religion."
However, Dawkins point is that the dogmatic teaching of religion to children makes them amenable to irrational unquestioned ideas later. That would also be true if we taught dogmatic atheism to children too. I think Dawkins, (and Stephen Law in "The War for Childrens' Minds") are really promoting the teaching of reasoning to children, and the removal of teaching of dogmatic religion - and are not proposing the teaching of atheism. Read Stephen Law's books on philosophy - they don't promote atheism as such, but ask questions and invite the reader to think of their own answers.
I think McGrath is right to point out that the meme hypothesis is purely that - with no evidence. The hypothesis can be made to fit history, but is it falsifiable, and what supportive evidence is there?
McGrath points out Blackmore's acceptence that atheism is a meme, just as theism is. Is atheism a meme? In some respects - when there is unquestioned belief in atheism. And I suppose the same hypothesis can be applied to any human idea - such as the appreciation of art, what art is, how it evolved, etc.
But scientific atheism accepts its own vulnerability, and does not claim infalability, and does not require faith. It is not a belief system in itself, but a consequence of what all humans do - attempt to understand and reason about the world around us. Atheism is a probabilistic conclusion, not a dogma, not a self sustaining belief. It may be that atheism as a world view is falsified in the future, by scientifically supported evidence of God. But how would theism be falsified? No matter what was discovered about the universe god could always be postulated to be beyond that.
McGrath points out some of the flaws in the meme hypothesis: "But my real question is this: how would Dr Blackmore and Professor Dennett be able to settle that point scientifically? If they are not able to do so, then we have a non-scientific debate about imaginary entities, hypothesised by analogy with the gene. And we all know how unreliable arguments based on analogy can be – witness the fruitless search for the luminiferous ether in the late nineteenth century, based on the supposed analogy between light and sound. It was analogically plausible – but non-existent. The analogy was invalid. Richard Dawkins tells us that memes are merely awaiting their Crick and Watson; I think they are merely waiting for their Michelson and Morley."
I would agree with this, particularly about the inappropriateness of analogies sometimes. Dawkins Burka analogy in "The God Delusion" is suspect, for example.
McGrath makes another good point about the association of 'evil' with religion: "Now Professor Dennett might respond by saying that these are not typical of atheism. I believe he would be right to do so. But neither are the excesses of violence and intolerance that he does mention, typical of religion. I appreciate the need for a bit of rhetoric and exaggeration to spice up an argument, but one cannot represent the pathological elements of any movement, religious or antireligious, as if they were normal or typical. Few of us in this audience tonight are in favour of fanaticism; but it is clearly perfectly possible to be a fanatical atheist, as much as a fanatical religionist. It’s fanaticism that’s the problem, not religion or anti-religion."
Agreed. I think the early use of the 'evil', as in 'evil in the name of...' and the other old chestnut 'the problem of evil' are fine as simplistic rebuttals of simplistic claims of theist about the inherent goodness of religion. Both theists and atheists would be better to leave these out of the main debate. Basically 'evil' can be performed by anyone, religious or not. And the problem of evil can be argued either way, as problematic for theism, or inconsequential as evidence against.
McGrath is right here: "In Oxford, we are facing a threat from one of the most fanatical groups in British society today: animal rights protestors. They are not religious. They are driven by an ideology – by a world view. Surely our common enemy is the fanatic, first and foremost. We need to reflect on how to control this phenomenon. But it is a clear factual error to assume that this is limited to, or necessarily characteristic of, religion."
However, Dawkins point is that the dogmatic teaching of religion to children makes them amenable to irrational unquestioned ideas later. That would also be true if we taught dogmatic atheism to children too. I think Dawkins, (and Stephen Law in "The War for Childrens' Minds") are really promoting the teaching of reasoning to children, and the removal of teaching of dogmatic religion - and are not proposing the teaching of atheism. Read Stephen Law's books on philosophy - they don't promote atheism as such, but ask questions and invite the reader to think of their own answers.
Saturday, 14 July 2007
Man U Prices
Poor Man U fans. John Mayall (surely he should be a blue) is suing the reds over cup ticket prices being included in the season ticket scheme - it used to be optional, as at Man City.
In response to some season ticket holders protesting by holding up their renewals, the United spokesman added: "We've a waiting list of 14,000 for season tickets and we regularly turned 5,000 people away for Premiership games last season."
So Man U are effectively saying "stuff you, there are more mugs where you came from who will pay."
In response to some season ticket holders protesting by holding up their renewals, the United spokesman added: "We've a waiting list of 14,000 for season tickets and we regularly turned 5,000 people away for Premiership games last season."
So Man U are effectively saying "stuff you, there are more mugs where you came from who will pay."
Tuesday, 26 June 2007
God and Analogies
On Stephen Law's Blog he posted a response to his The Jesus Light, by Sebastian: http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2007/06/jesus-light-switched-back-on.html. Had to get this off my chest.
Analogy - Helpful in the explanation of point A in terms of point B, where B is a more commonly understood point. But the use of an analogy, however effective, does not consist of proof of correctness of the original point A; or even evidence for it. Analogies can often sound good but can be way off the mark. In this particular case the whole God idea is so vague a notion almost any analogy could be concocted to explain God.
My personal analogy is that God is an invisible pet. I love my cats, I talk to them, communicate with them and can have quite complex conversations. I work from home, alone most of the day. My family are removed daily, though unlike Sebastian's women they reappear each evening, fortunately. But, I have an inner drive to talk to someone. It's often myself, but also my cats. I get great inner satisfaction from that. Some find solice in the company of machines - the Tamagotchi 'pets' of a few years ago. We have an inner yearning for companionship and communication, as do many animals. Along the evolutionary trail humans have picked up imagination. We've used that to invent God as a perfect companion, who listens without complaint, anywhere any time - the perfect Tamagotchi. We can even delude ourselves that our own answers to our own problems have been provided by Him. Inventing human companionship in anything is easy. Anthropomorphism rules - ok?
I have no evidence for this. I've based it, rather loosely, on what little I've read in popular books on psycology, evolution, biology, etc. I might even have read it somewhere explicitly, and using the great power of imagination convinced myself it's my own idea.
I could also be convinced by steelman's God. I'm a Manchester City supporter - I'm currently in purgatory, waiting to be saved by Thaiksin Shinawatra. I'm certainly having my faith challenged. I know there are very convincing arguments why I should watch Manchester United instead, but like any good theist, I'll listen, digest, ignore, and plod on regardless.
Sebastian's rejection of the 'tooth-fairy' myth is rejected simply because it's not his myth. I may well have belived in fairies, Santa, God, The Lone Ranger, or any other myth, when I was a kid. But to suggest that anyone who discovers that they are myths would "fall into a state of lifelong depression" is a little presumptuous. I find it liberating to know that somewhere, sometime there could be an answer to anything, just waiting to be discovered. The fact that I don't and can't know everything isn't a problem. I'm happy to search for answers on the understanding that I won't necessarily find them. I have no need for God. Quite the opposite - I find God to be an unsatisfactory answer to anything, a cop-out.
Maybe in the past God and religion have provided apporpriate stop-gaps, until other ideas became more acceptable and the arguments clearer. Phlogiston provided a pretty good explanation for combustion, until oxidation supplanted it, but it's still a passable analogy if you don't know of or ignore evidence against it.
Despite all that's said about the scientific method, plenty of research begins with a hunch, or an unsubstantiated hypothesis. The scientific method comes into its own in evaluating evidence to support or reject the hypothesis. So far the God hypothesis has zero evidence in its favour. Plenty of imagination and analogy, but zero evidence. Cold fusion is an attractive idea that has had its proponents from time to time, but as yet no repeatable un-falsified evidence, so there aren't many supporters of it. Alien abduction is another unsubstantiated popular myth, that thankfully has been debunked pretty thoroughly - but that doesn't mean the evidence against it is conclusive, and so there are still people out there that believe in it. Similarly, the evidence against God is low - non-existent - we only have Ocham's Razor, but since we apply that to the tooth-fairy and other myths, why not to the God myth.
I would suggest, though it's only my own crack-pot hypothesis with no statistics to back it up, that most religious people believe in God because they haven't thought about it enough, don't understand the arguments (re Sebastians response to the barefoot bum), or are persuaded by charismatic intelligent con-men; and many of those con-men do a pretty good job of convincing themselves. Many don't even believe in order to fill this internal desire that Sebastian speaks of. Most believe because they were indoctrinated, out of tradition, out of fear (see Law, Dwakins, etc). That's my understanding, based on the deplorably inadequate sample that consists of the few personal friends and relatives I've discussed it with, and on reading the ideas presented in print, in documentaries and on the internet by supporters of theist arguments. Statistics, for or against, anyone?
Analogy - Helpful in the explanation of point A in terms of point B, where B is a more commonly understood point. But the use of an analogy, however effective, does not consist of proof of correctness of the original point A; or even evidence for it. Analogies can often sound good but can be way off the mark. In this particular case the whole God idea is so vague a notion almost any analogy could be concocted to explain God.
My personal analogy is that God is an invisible pet. I love my cats, I talk to them, communicate with them and can have quite complex conversations. I work from home, alone most of the day. My family are removed daily, though unlike Sebastian's women they reappear each evening, fortunately. But, I have an inner drive to talk to someone. It's often myself, but also my cats. I get great inner satisfaction from that. Some find solice in the company of machines - the Tamagotchi 'pets' of a few years ago. We have an inner yearning for companionship and communication, as do many animals. Along the evolutionary trail humans have picked up imagination. We've used that to invent God as a perfect companion, who listens without complaint, anywhere any time - the perfect Tamagotchi. We can even delude ourselves that our own answers to our own problems have been provided by Him. Inventing human companionship in anything is easy. Anthropomorphism rules - ok?
I have no evidence for this. I've based it, rather loosely, on what little I've read in popular books on psycology, evolution, biology, etc. I might even have read it somewhere explicitly, and using the great power of imagination convinced myself it's my own idea.
I could also be convinced by steelman's God. I'm a Manchester City supporter - I'm currently in purgatory, waiting to be saved by Thaiksin Shinawatra. I'm certainly having my faith challenged. I know there are very convincing arguments why I should watch Manchester United instead, but like any good theist, I'll listen, digest, ignore, and plod on regardless.
Sebastian's rejection of the 'tooth-fairy' myth is rejected simply because it's not his myth. I may well have belived in fairies, Santa, God, The Lone Ranger, or any other myth, when I was a kid. But to suggest that anyone who discovers that they are myths would "fall into a state of lifelong depression" is a little presumptuous. I find it liberating to know that somewhere, sometime there could be an answer to anything, just waiting to be discovered. The fact that I don't and can't know everything isn't a problem. I'm happy to search for answers on the understanding that I won't necessarily find them. I have no need for God. Quite the opposite - I find God to be an unsatisfactory answer to anything, a cop-out.
Maybe in the past God and religion have provided apporpriate stop-gaps, until other ideas became more acceptable and the arguments clearer. Phlogiston provided a pretty good explanation for combustion, until oxidation supplanted it, but it's still a passable analogy if you don't know of or ignore evidence against it.
Despite all that's said about the scientific method, plenty of research begins with a hunch, or an unsubstantiated hypothesis. The scientific method comes into its own in evaluating evidence to support or reject the hypothesis. So far the God hypothesis has zero evidence in its favour. Plenty of imagination and analogy, but zero evidence. Cold fusion is an attractive idea that has had its proponents from time to time, but as yet no repeatable un-falsified evidence, so there aren't many supporters of it. Alien abduction is another unsubstantiated popular myth, that thankfully has been debunked pretty thoroughly - but that doesn't mean the evidence against it is conclusive, and so there are still people out there that believe in it. Similarly, the evidence against God is low - non-existent - we only have Ocham's Razor, but since we apply that to the tooth-fairy and other myths, why not to the God myth.
I would suggest, though it's only my own crack-pot hypothesis with no statistics to back it up, that most religious people believe in God because they haven't thought about it enough, don't understand the arguments (re Sebastians response to the barefoot bum), or are persuaded by charismatic intelligent con-men; and many of those con-men do a pretty good job of convincing themselves. Many don't even believe in order to fill this internal desire that Sebastian speaks of. Most believe because they were indoctrinated, out of tradition, out of fear (see Law, Dwakins, etc). That's my understanding, based on the deplorably inadequate sample that consists of the few personal friends and relatives I've discussed it with, and on reading the ideas presented in print, in documentaries and on the internet by supporters of theist arguments. Statistics, for or against, anyone?
Thursday, 14 June 2007
The Problem with Faith
Following on from my previous blog, I think the crutial point is faith.
I think Stephen is right in that any point of view can be a faith (http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/ - Faith topic), and that's certainly the case for most, if not all, religions. And I personally know at least one person for whom atheism is a faith. She has no interest in any arguments one way or the other, and certainly has no interest in science, but believes herself to be endowed with ultra reliable common sense, to the extent that she believes the whole God business is nonsense. It's as if this faith of hers has grown out of some dissatisfaction with religion and all its trappings, a discomfort in the presence of religious people and proceedings. And I detect a similar discomfort in the absence of religion, or in the company of atheists, in some religious people. The opposing point of view is dismissed out of hand, with little discussion. Whichever way you lean this is a pretty insecure faith.
The faith expressed by professional theologians and serious theists appears to be much stronger, both in intensity and in the degree of thought put into it. I think that this is the type of religious faith with which atheism is competing; but which atheism? Not the atheism promoted by the feeble faith atheists - the faith atheism that theists attack, but scientific atheism. And this scientific atheism isn't a faith, though it is a belief system.
With the strong theological faith, when all the trappings are stripped away, when all the arguments of reason against it have been put forward and dismissed, what is left is pure and absolute faith. An explanation is not required. That's it. No argument.
Science based atheism isn't that. And in not being that, it isn't a faith, or not a strong faith. Science based atheism relies entirely on empiricism at its base. And in that it is, and will always be, open to doubt and question. I don't mean the personal doubt that one might have in any belief system, but an underlying inherent doubt in the system itself. Every currently understood 'fact' upon which all science is based is ultimately in doubt. The limitations of its tools of deduction and induction are often pointed out by the faith followers, and rightly. Most arguments are circular and nothing is conclusive. There is no absolute - though for practical reasons it may often be convenient to act is if there is.
But not only all that; there's another element of the science that is at the heart of science based atheism: the requirement for Popper's falsificationism. Science, and scientific based atheism requires this. Not just now, to ensure that for some current theory to be valuable it must be falsifiable, but in perpetuity. No matter how far into the future we look, no matter to what extent we evolve, whatever answers we find, there will always be something we don't know, or cannot know at that time.
To put it simply, I have no absolute faith in my current belief in science based atheism, but I do believe it, because all the current evidence I have tells me it's the best choice for a belief system.
So, does God exist? Theist faith tells me he does, but gives me no reason to believe it, so why should I. Science merely tells me he probably doesn't, but gives me very good reason for believing he doesn't.
Neither point of view has any baring on the existence of God. He exists or he doesn't, irrespective of which belief system one follows.
And, his existence or not has little consequence for the two belief systems. If God doesn't exist then it won't matter to the religious. They can go on believing and they'll never know. As each draws his terminal breath that'll be the end of him. And for the scientific atheists there's not even the satisfaction that we haven't yet been proved wrong, because our position will remain the same - he still might exist. An if he does exist, there's no change for the faithful - they knew it all along. If they find he exists I hope there won't be too much gloating, as that would imply they weren't as sure as they've been saying they were before his existence became evident. And for the scientific? Maybe no longer strictly atheists, since being true to our principles we should be happy to accept the new evidence - just not absolutely.
I think Stephen is right in that any point of view can be a faith (http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/ - Faith topic), and that's certainly the case for most, if not all, religions. And I personally know at least one person for whom atheism is a faith. She has no interest in any arguments one way or the other, and certainly has no interest in science, but believes herself to be endowed with ultra reliable common sense, to the extent that she believes the whole God business is nonsense. It's as if this faith of hers has grown out of some dissatisfaction with religion and all its trappings, a discomfort in the presence of religious people and proceedings. And I detect a similar discomfort in the absence of religion, or in the company of atheists, in some religious people. The opposing point of view is dismissed out of hand, with little discussion. Whichever way you lean this is a pretty insecure faith.
The faith expressed by professional theologians and serious theists appears to be much stronger, both in intensity and in the degree of thought put into it. I think that this is the type of religious faith with which atheism is competing; but which atheism? Not the atheism promoted by the feeble faith atheists - the faith atheism that theists attack, but scientific atheism. And this scientific atheism isn't a faith, though it is a belief system.
With the strong theological faith, when all the trappings are stripped away, when all the arguments of reason against it have been put forward and dismissed, what is left is pure and absolute faith. An explanation is not required. That's it. No argument.
Science based atheism isn't that. And in not being that, it isn't a faith, or not a strong faith. Science based atheism relies entirely on empiricism at its base. And in that it is, and will always be, open to doubt and question. I don't mean the personal doubt that one might have in any belief system, but an underlying inherent doubt in the system itself. Every currently understood 'fact' upon which all science is based is ultimately in doubt. The limitations of its tools of deduction and induction are often pointed out by the faith followers, and rightly. Most arguments are circular and nothing is conclusive. There is no absolute - though for practical reasons it may often be convenient to act is if there is.
But not only all that; there's another element of the science that is at the heart of science based atheism: the requirement for Popper's falsificationism. Science, and scientific based atheism requires this. Not just now, to ensure that for some current theory to be valuable it must be falsifiable, but in perpetuity. No matter how far into the future we look, no matter to what extent we evolve, whatever answers we find, there will always be something we don't know, or cannot know at that time.
To put it simply, I have no absolute faith in my current belief in science based atheism, but I do believe it, because all the current evidence I have tells me it's the best choice for a belief system.
So, does God exist? Theist faith tells me he does, but gives me no reason to believe it, so why should I. Science merely tells me he probably doesn't, but gives me very good reason for believing he doesn't.
Neither point of view has any baring on the existence of God. He exists or he doesn't, irrespective of which belief system one follows.
And, his existence or not has little consequence for the two belief systems. If God doesn't exist then it won't matter to the religious. They can go on believing and they'll never know. As each draws his terminal breath that'll be the end of him. And for the scientific atheists there's not even the satisfaction that we haven't yet been proved wrong, because our position will remain the same - he still might exist. An if he does exist, there's no change for the faithful - they knew it all along. If they find he exists I hope there won't be too much gloating, as that would imply they weren't as sure as they've been saying they were before his existence became evident. And for the scientific? Maybe no longer strictly atheists, since being true to our principles we should be happy to accept the new evidence - just not absolutely.
The Problem of Evil
I've read Stephen Law's view on the Problem of Evil and other arguments for the atheism. In particular, this article:
http://www.humanism.org.uk/site/cms/contentViewArticle.asp?article=1475
"Why would a benevolent God do, or allow...?" Why wouldn't he? If God exists, there is no reason to suppose he has any regard for our interpretation of good and evil. As atheists we often argue that there is no good or evil, just things and events - the good or the evil being some human interpretation. So why should we then suppose there is a problem of evil at all? Shit happens, as they say.
Theists can conjure up any explanation they like to explain the problem of evil, and over the centuries they have manufactured many, so it's pretty useless labouring the point. Yes, it might cause them some minor embarrassment, but it doesn't take much effort for them to rationalise (sic) away any objections. They already have magic on their side, so the the problem of evil argument isn't going to win them over.
Stephen says:
"So it seems to me that there’s little evidence to suggest that God does exist. Indeed, the problem of evil provides powerful evidence in that He doesn’t."
I agree with the first sentence. I strongly disagree with the second. The problem of evil presupposes rationality in the theist position. There isn't any. I also agree with Ockham's razor, as descibed by Stephen - pick the simplest hypothesis. But Stephen then goes on to put this valuable tool to one side with:
"But the fact is that atheists don’t need to appeal to Ockham’s razor to justify their belief that there is no God. They already possess a very powerful justification for believing that there is no God the justification provided by the problem of evil."
It's not that powerful a justification - it's irrelevent. It's Ockham's razor that trumps the problem of evil, not the other way round.
There's no evidence for, and so no good reason to believe in God.
http://www.humanism.org.uk/site/cms/contentViewArticle.asp?article=1475
"Why would a benevolent God do, or allow...?" Why wouldn't he? If God exists, there is no reason to suppose he has any regard for our interpretation of good and evil. As atheists we often argue that there is no good or evil, just things and events - the good or the evil being some human interpretation. So why should we then suppose there is a problem of evil at all? Shit happens, as they say.
Theists can conjure up any explanation they like to explain the problem of evil, and over the centuries they have manufactured many, so it's pretty useless labouring the point. Yes, it might cause them some minor embarrassment, but it doesn't take much effort for them to rationalise (sic) away any objections. They already have magic on their side, so the the problem of evil argument isn't going to win them over.
Stephen says:
"So it seems to me that there’s little evidence to suggest that God does exist. Indeed, the problem of evil provides powerful evidence in that He doesn’t."
I agree with the first sentence. I strongly disagree with the second. The problem of evil presupposes rationality in the theist position. There isn't any. I also agree with Ockham's razor, as descibed by Stephen - pick the simplest hypothesis. But Stephen then goes on to put this valuable tool to one side with:
"But the fact is that atheists don’t need to appeal to Ockham’s razor to justify their belief that there is no God. They already possess a very powerful justification for believing that there is no God the justification provided by the problem of evil."
It's not that powerful a justification - it's irrelevent. It's Ockham's razor that trumps the problem of evil, not the other way round.
There's no evidence for, and so no good reason to believe in God.
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